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FEDERALISM, UNIFORMITY, AND THE STATE CONSTITUTION-State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
In State v. Gunwall' the Washington Supreme Court announced six
criteria that Washington courts are to employ in determining whether a
constitutional claim should be decided on state rather than federal
grounds. 2 This method of state constitutional analysis implicitly rejects the
idea that the state constitution applies to every case in which it is raised.
Instead, the method assumes that the federal Constitution controls claims
that individual rights have been violated, unless application of the state
constitution can be justified through use of the court's criteria. 3 These
criteria confine the development of independent state constitutional doctrines to provisions of the state constitution that are textually distinct from
the federal Constitution, or to cases that present other defined reasons for
4
departing from federal doctrine.
The Gunwall court's method of state constitutional analysis undermines
the role of Washington's constitution as a fundamental element of the state's
law. This Note proposes a method for state constitutional analysis that is not
focused on maintaining consistency with the content of federal doctrine. A
principled, independent body of state constitutional law will not be readily
achieved unless state courts focus directly on the text and structure of the
state constitution in its entirety, without employing limitations that are
keyed to federal constitutional doctrine.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM

A.

The HistoricalRelationship Between State and Federal
Constitutions

Many of our fundamental rights are rooted in a common law tradition
that began developing long before 1776. 5 These common law rights were
incorporated into the early state constitutions that were drawn before the
federal constitutional convention was convened. 6 State constitutions thus
1. 106 Wn. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
2. Id. at 58-59, 720 P.2d at 810-11.
3. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
4. Gunwall, at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
5. Force, State "Bills of Rights":A Caseof Neglect and the Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L.
REV. 125, 131 (1969).
6. Linde, FirstThings First:Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379,

381 (1980).
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preceded the federal Constitution, 7 and played an essential role in protecting individual liberties when the Union was formed. 8
Creation of the federal government and its constitution left this role
intact. State and federal constitutions coexisted, and with respect to civil
liberties, each document acted as an independent check within its own
sphere of influence. 9 State declarations of rights restrained the exercise of
power by the states, and the federal Bill of Rights restrained the federal
government. 10 These roles were determined by the nature of the federalist
system, which apportioned power between the states and the nation, and
among governmental departments, thereby affording a "double security"
to the people."
B.

The Development of National Rights

Although under this original scheme state constitutions were to protect
citizens from overreaching by state governments, the Civil War era demonstrated that state constitutional protections were not reliable for all citizens. 12 After the adoption of the Reconstruction amendments, 13 litigants
7. Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 977 (1979).
8.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-3 (1978).

9. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Brennan, State Constitutions
and the ProtectionoflndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,493 (1977); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1327 (1982) [hereinafter
Developments]; Project Report, Towardan Activist Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 271, 277 (1973).
10. Developments, supra note 9, at 1336 n.28; Project Report, supra note 9. No bill of rights was
included in the Constitution as originally accepted and ratified by the states, Developments, supra note
9, at 1327, in part because state constitutions, being already in existence, were considered sufficient to
the task. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (remarks of

Roger Sherman). Although the original draft of the amendments to the Constitution proposed by James
Madison in 1789 contained a provision expressly prohibiting the states from violating "the equal rights
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases," this amendment was
rejected. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (J. Gales ed. 1789); Project Report, supra note 9, at 276.
11. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration
of a single government; and . . . usurpations are guarded against by a division of the
government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the
power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at
the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 67 (J. Madison) (L. DeKoster ed. 1976). Of course, the states did not literally
control the federal government. However, because power over local affairs was thought to have been
retained by the states, and because the states could be expected to jealously guard that power, a check on
federal power existed, at least theoretically. See also Project Report, supra note 9, at 286.
12. See Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 174
(1984).
13. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
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looked increasingly to the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution and the United States Supreme Court for protection of civil liberties. 14
The gradual application of the federal Bill of Rights to the states through the
fourteenth amendment 5 radically changed the historical relationship between state and federal constitutions. 16 Federal law protecting individual
civil liberties expanded rapidly, accompanied by a decline in the number of
17
state court decisions relying on state constitutions.
C.

"Rebirth" of State ConstitutionalLaw

With a system of national rights firmly in place, state constitutions
played only a minor role in protecting civil liberties. 18 However, when the
broadly protective doctrines developed by the Warren Court began to be
limited by the Burger Court, reliance on state constitutions was renewed.' 9
Modem state constitutional analysis rests upon the idea that federal constitutional law establishes a "floor," or minimum level of protection, but does

not prevent states from granting their citizens greater protection. 20 State
constitutions may be independently interpreted so long as the national level
21
of protection is not subverted.
Courts and commentators assert that independent interpretation is valuable for at least three reasons. 22 First, it enhances the integrity of state law,
14. Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454, 455-56, 464-65 (1970);
Brennan, supra note 9, at 493-94; Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 977-78.
15. Brennan, supra note 9, at 493-94. The majority of the protections provided by the Bill of
Rights were not applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment until the Warren Court years of
1962-1969. Id.
16. Project Report, supra note 9, at 282-84; see also Peterkort, The Conflict Between State and
Federal Constitutionally GuaranteedRights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of State
Constitutions, 32 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 158, 159 (1981).
17. For instance, Washington abandoned the exclusionary rule adopted by the state courts in 1922
in State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390, after the United States Supreme Court applied the
federal exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), limitedby United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See Note, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent
ExclusionaryRule: ConstitutionalRight and ConstitutionallyCompelled Remedy, 61 WASH. L. REV.
459, 465 (1986).
18. Brennan, supra note 9, at 495; Developments, supra note 9, at 1328.
19. Wilkes, The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure:State CourtEvasion ofthe Burger Court,
62 Ky. L.J. 421,425 (1974). Justice Brennan actively urged use ofstate constitutions as a way to achieve
additional protection. Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 874-75 (1976).
20. Wilkes, supra note 19, at 425-26; Force, supranote 5, at 129; Developments, supra note 9, at
1334-35.
21. Developments, supra note 9, at 1334.
22. Statev. Coe, 101 Wn. 2d364, 373-74,679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984); Utter, FreedomandDiversity
in a FederalSystem: Perspectiveson State Constitutionsand the Washington Declarationof Rights, 7
U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 491, 493-96 (1984); Comment, Robinson at Large in the Fifty States: A
Continuationof the State Bills of Rights Debate in the Search and Seizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE
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thus reinforcing state sovereignty and preserving the federalist system. 23
Second, it creates a safety net for individual civil liberties. 24 Finally, it
permits experimentation in developing new theories for protecting those
liberties.25

The principle that state constitutions can be interpreted independently
has been readily accepted. 26 However, in an era when federal protection is
considered the norm, state courts have not agreed on what theory justifies
relying on state constitutions. 27 The concept of federal rights as a protective
"floor" leaves many unanswered questions about the role that state constitutions are to play. 28 For example, state courts must decide whether to

examine federal law or state law first.29 They must ensure that the federal
floor is preserved, even where federal law is unclear. 30 They must decide
whether, and what, principles exist to limit the scope of state constitutions
and the judicial decisions construing them. 31 Finally, they must accept that
the increased diversity in protections for individual rights that is the direct
consequence of constitutional federalism is desirable. 32 Courts have developed three general ways of dealing with these issues. 33 These approaches may be termed the deferential model, 34 the primacy model, 35 and
36
the interstitial model.

U.L. REV. 1, 108-09(1974); Note, The UtahSupreme Court and the Utah State Constitution, 2 UTAH L.
REV. 319, 327 (1986). But see Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 975-77 (arguing that
independent interpretation reallocates power from state legislatures to state courts, and may make the
Supreme Court less willing to extend the protection of the federal Constitution; for one response to this
argument, see infra note 180).
23. See supra note 22.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Over 300 opinions adopting independent state constitutional interpretation have been counted.
Collins & Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicialReview: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional
IndividualRights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317, 317 (1986).
27. See Collins and Galie, supra note 26, at 322-39; Note, Rediscovering State Constitutionsfor
IndividualRights Protection, 37 BAYLOR L. REv. 463, 464-72 (1985).
28. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1336-37.
29. Utter, supra note 22, at 492.
30. Developments, supra note 9, at 1358.
31. Utter, supra note 22, at 492.
32. See id.
33. A more elaborate breakdown of methods for state constitutional interpretation is discussed in
Collins & Galie, supra note 26, at 323-39. The five models presented there are essentially subcategories of the deferential, primacy and interstitial models discussed infra in parts C. 1-3.
34. The term "deferential model" will be used in this Note to refer to the approach adopted by those
courts that have chosen to interpret their state constitutions coextensively with analogous federal
provisions. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. The term is not generally used by other
commentators.
35. Developments, supra note 9, at 1356-57; Note, supra note 22, at 326-28.
36. Note, supra note 22, at 328-29.

State Constitutional Analysis
1.

DeferentialModel

The deferential model assumes that constitutional rights are first and
37
foremost federal rights defined by the United States Supreme Court.
Courts adopting this model avoid the issues that independent state constitutional analysis raises by simply interpreting state provisions evoked by
litigants coextensively with federal provisions.38 By finding the state provision to guarantee the same level of rights as the federal Constitution-no
more and no less-they need only make the federal analysis. Courts have
adopted this approach not only where the language of the state constitution
is the same as the federal language, but even where the state language is
different.3 9 Because the result is the same as if the state constitution had
never been discussed, the deferential 40model cannot truly be considered a
model of independent interpretation.
2.

Primacy Model

In sharp contrast, the primacy model assumes that the application of the
federal Bill of Rights to the states has established protections in addition to
those provided by state constitutions, but has left the role of state constitutions otherwise unchanged. 41 Under this view, since state constitutions are
both "first in time and first in logic," 42 issues raised under state provisions
should always be addressed before reaching federal constitutional
grounds. 43 If the litigant succeeds on the state constitutional claim, there is
no need to consider any federal claim raised, since44the federal claim is not
presented for decision unless the state claim fails.
The primacy model ensures that the litigant is accorded the full protection of the state constitution, while retaining all of the benefits of federal
constitutional protection. If state law meets or exceeds the level of federal
protection, it controls the resolution of the claim. If, however, the state law
37. Linde, supra note 6, at 382-83.
38. See, e.g., Northend Cinemav. Seattle, 90Wn. 2d709,714-15, 585 P.2d 1153,1156-57 (1978),
cert. denied, Apple Theatre, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
39. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyondthe "New Federalism," 8 U.
PUGET SOuND L. REV. vi, ix (1984); Kelman, Foreword:Rediscoveringthe State ConstitutionalBill of
Rights, 27 WAYNE L. REv, 413, 417 (1981).
40. Kelman, supra note 39, at 414.
41. Linde, supranote 6, at 381-82.
42. Id. at 380.
43. Id. at 383; see also State v. Coe, 101 Wn. 2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984).
Consideration of state claims first under this model is based in part upon the historical precedence of
state constitutions, Linde, supra note 12, at 174, and upon the principle that legal issues should be
decided on the basis of the lowest available law. Utter, supra note 22, at 505.
44. Linde, supra note 6, at 383; see also infra note 46.

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:569, 1987

falls below the federal "floor," or is so broad that it invades some other
countervailing federal right, it must give way to the federal Constitution. 45
Between the "floor" and the "ceiling" established by federal constitutional
law, consideration of the state constitution is primary. 46 Commentators
have found this model particularly well-suited to supporting state sov47
ereignty, because it accords high status to the state constitution.
3.

InterstitialModel

Some judges and commentators who accept that state constitutions may
be applied independently resist the idea that maintaining the original
relationship between state and federal constitutions is possible or desirable. 48 The "interstitial" model developed by these theorists assumes that
analysis of constitutional claims should always begin with the federal
Constitution. The model then employs specific criteria to determine when a
litigant's rights ought to be afforded alternative protection under the state
constitution. 4 9 Under this model, the primary role of the state constitution
is to supplement and "fill in the spaces" where there is no federal counterpart to a state constitutional provision or where federal law is undeveloped. 50 The state constitution may also apply to supplant federal
analysis with state analysis where required by defined criteria. 51
The interstitial model rejects both total deference to federal constitutional analysis in interpreting state constitutions, 52 and the idea that a
complete body of independent state law should be developed. 53 While the
primacy model views state constitutions as providing a full constellation of
45. Developments, supra note 9, at 1334-35; see also Peterkort, supra note 16, at 163.
46. Developments, supra note 9, at 1334-35. Under the primacy model, the litigant who raises
both state and federal claims has three potential outcomes. First, he may succeed on the state claim, in
which case the federal claim will not be reached. Second, he may fail on the state claim and succeed on
the federal claim, indicating that protection under the state provision is too low. Finally, he may fail to
succeed under both state and federal provisions.
47. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions:Some Random Thoughts, 54 Miss. L.J. 371, 374-77
(1984); Utter, supra note 22, at 505.
48. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982); see, e.g., Bice, Anderson and the
Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750, 756-58 (1977); Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note
7, at 990-91; Howard, supra note 19, at 934-37; Developments, supra note 9, at 1336-37.
49. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (1982); Bice, supra note 48, at
756-58; Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 990-91; Howard, supra note 19, at 934-37;
Developments, supra note 9, at 1336-37.
50. Collins, supra note 47, at 405; see generally Developments, supra note 9, at 1357-66
(discussing interstitial model and its application).
51. See, e.g., infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.

State Constitutional Analysis
rights in addition to those provided by the federal Constitution, 54 the
interstitial model views state constitutional provisions as providing alternatives that are available only where deviation from the federal rule can be
expressly justified. 55 The state and federal constitutions may be thought of
as parallel lines under primacy analysis, but as a system of overlays with
cutouts under interstitial analysis.
D. Adequate State Grounds
An important issue for courts that engage in independent state constitutional interpretation is the potential for federal review of their decisions.
Analysis of state constitutional issues under the interstitial model always
discusses federal constitutional doctrine. Analysis under the primacy
model may discuss it by analogy in disposing of the state law claim. The
must be able to resist review by federal
state law decisions in these cases
56
courts if they are to be final.
The United States Supreme Court recently expanded its jurisdiction to
review state cases that discuss both state and federal constitutional doctrine
in Michiganv. Long. 57 Under the Long analysis, decisions applying a state
constitutional provision must rest upon "bona fide separate, adequate and
independent state grounds" 58 if they are to survive petitions for federal
review. Although this requirement does not expressly prevent recourse to
federal precedent in analyzing the state constitution, the independence of
59
the state ground must be "apparent from the four comers" of the opinion.
If the decision rests primarily on federal law or is interwoven with federal
law, the Supreme Court may accept review. 60 Any federal cases cited in a
state constitutional analysis must be accompanied by a "plain statement"
that they are only being used persuasively, and do not compel the result
reached under the state constitution. 61 Avoiding federal review enhances
54. Linde, supra note 6, at 381-82.
55. Note, State Constitutional Guarantees as Adequate State Ground: Supreme Court Review and
Problems of Federalism, 13 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 737, 743-44 (1976).
56. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); Collins, supra note 47, at 395.
57. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
58. Id. at 1041.
59. Id. at 1040.
60. Id. at 1040-41.
61. Id. at 1041. If the independent state grounds fail to hold up under this standard the Supreme
Court is free to circumvent the state constitutional analysis, and substitute federal doctrine. This is so
even where the state has a preexisting body of law construing its constitution to grant broader rights, if
the state court fails to cite that body of law and to separate clearly any discussion of federal precedent
from its holding under the state constitution. Id. at 1043-44, 1044 n.9; see generally Seid, Schizoid
Federalism, Supreme Court Power and Inadequate Adequate State Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long,
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the credibility and precedential value of a court's independent state constitutional analysis. 62 Therefore, how well its method of analysis meets the
constraints imposed by Long is an important consideration. 63
E.

Independent State Constitutional Grounds and the Washington
Court

Washington cases decided on independent state constitutional grounds
date from the mid-1970's. 64 These cases employ a variety of approaches to
state constitutional analysis, but do not adopt a consistent methodology. A
1978 decision stated that the "general rule" was to give state constitutional
provisions the same interpretation as analogous provisions of the federal
Constitution. 65 Several cases have relied on differences in the texts of state
and federal provisions to justify relying on the state constitution. 66 At least
one case relied on a state provision with no federal counterpart. 67 The 1984
case of State v. Coe employed the primacy method of analysis, 68 but its
18 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 20-23 (1984) (discussing Michigan law of search and seizure and impact of
Supreme Court's analysis).
62. Cf Collins, supra note 47, at 395 (discussing impact on certainty of state law of analytical
method that avoids federal review).
63. The Long standard is less deferential to the decisions of state courts than prior formulations of
the doctrine. See Collins, Plain Statements: The Supreme Court's New Requirement, 70 A.B.A. J. 92,
92 (March 1984) (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945)). Long has been viewed as an adverse
reaction by the Court to the development of state court doctrines that conflict with corresponding
federal doctrine. Collins, supra note 47, at 398 & n.85; Seid, supra note 61, at 8-9.
64. See. e.g.. Carter v. University of Washington, 85 Wn. 2d 391, 536 P.2d 618 (1975) (finding
constitutional right of appeal for indigent party in civil case), overruled, Housing Auth. v. Saylors. 87
Wn. 2d 732, 557 P.2d 321 (1976); cases cited in Utter. supranote 22, at 493 n.4. But see Petstel, Inc. v.
County of King, 77 Wn. 2d 144, 153-54, 459 P.2d 937, 942 (1969) (court acknowledged that
independent interpretation was theoretically possible, but rejected a claim that Washington Constitution art. 1, § 3 be interpreted differently from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.)
Only those cases decided on state constitutional grounds after the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states are discussed here. Washington cases decided on state constitutional grounds prior to the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment are not properly within the scope of
the term "independent interpretation." because the only possible grounds for decision were those of the
state constitution. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
65. Northend Cinema v. Seattle, 90 Wn. 2d 709,714,585 P.2d 1153, 1156-57 (1978), cert. denied,
Apple Theatre, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 441 U.S. 946 (1979). The court acknowledged, however, that it
was not compelled to adopt the federal construction. Id.
66. See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (WASH. CONST. art. I. § 7),
overruled, State v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986); State v. White, 97 Wn. 2d 92, 640
P.2d 1061 (1982) (WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 7); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.
2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 5); State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170,622 P.2d 1199
(1980) (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7).
67. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (WASH. CONST. art. XXI, § 1).
68. 101 Wn. 2d 364,373,679 P.2d 353,359 (1984) (overturning trial court order banning radio and
television broadcast of tape recordings played in open court).
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rationale 69 for this methodology was not influential. 70
A number of Washington cases interpreting the state constitution independently have involved Washington Constitution article I, sectiofl 7, the
state counterpart to the fourth amendment. 71 In general, Washington courts
have developed stricter rules governing police conduct under this section
than the United States Supreme Court has adopted in interpreting the fourth
amendment. 72 The article I, section 7 cases have been controversial because of the difficulties they are said to present for police, who must decide
in advance whether their actions will have to pass muster under federal
standards or under some more stringent state standard. 73 This problem has
made some state judges skeptical of independent state constitutional interpretation. 74 It is in this climate that the Washington Supreme Court in State
v. Gunwall turned its attention to the methodology used to arrive at
independent interpretation.

II. STATE v. GUNWALL
A.

Facts and Procedure

The petitioner in State v. Gunwall was charged with violations of the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act on the basis of evidence seized in a
search of her home.75 Although the search was conducted pursuant to a
warrant, the affidavit used to obtain the warrant relied on information
69. The Coe court rested its decision to address state claims first on several grounds, including the
nature of the federal system, the historical development of the state and federal constitutions, state
sovereignty, and the principle that a court should not apply the highest law to invalidate governmental
action when a lesser rule will suffice. State v. Coe, 101 Wn. 2d at 373-74, 679 P.2d at 359.
70. A chronological review of subsequent cases reveals that the state courts have not followed the
Coe court's method of analyzing the state constitution first. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn. 2d 631,639,
683 P.2d 1079, 1085 (1984) (where the court analyzed the federal Constitution before considering the
state constitution); State v. Crandall, 39 Wn. App. 849, 853, 697 P.2d 250 (1985) (same); State v.
Brooks, 43 Wn. App. 560, 565, 718 P.2d 837, 839 (1986) (same); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54,
64-65, 720 P.2d 808, 814 (1986) (same).
71. See e.g., supra note 66; compareU.S. CoNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.") with WASH.
CONsT. art. I., § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.").
72. See, e.g., Utter, supra note 22, at 493 n.4.
73. State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 705-06, 674 P.2d 1240, 1251 (1983) (Dimmick, J.,
dissenting), overruled, State v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
74. Id.; State v. Simpson, 95 Wn. 2d 170,200-02, 622 P.2d 1199, 1214-18 (1980) (Horowitz, L,
dissenting).
75. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 55-56, 720 P.2d 808, 809-10 (1986).
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derived from telephone toll records and from placement of a pen register7 6
on petitioner's telephone. 77 Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence
obtained in the search on the basis that the information derived from the pen
register and the telephone toll records was illegally obtained. 78 The trial
court denied the motion, and petitioner Gunwall appealed directly to the
79
Washington Supreme Court.
B.

The Court's Methodfor Analyzing State ConstitutionalIssues

The Gunwall court held that to the extent the warrant was based on the
information gained through the pen register and telephone toll records, it
was invalid under Washington Constitution article I, section 7.80 As the
court noted, this conclusion would not have been reached under federal law,
because the fourth amendment does not require a warrant for the placement
of a pen register on a private telephone line, nor does it protect telephone
toll records. 8 1 In deciding that article I, section 7 compels a different result,
the court discussed federal law first, and then employed six "nonexclusive
neutral criteria" to conclude that resort to separate and independent state
grounds was appropriate in this particular case. 82 The text of each criterion,
the court's method of applying it, and the conclusions reached thereby, are
83
discussed below.
1. "Textual language of the state constitution.' ' 84 The court's first
criterion considers whether the text of the state constitution may provide
grounds for reaching a different decision than would be reached under the
76. A device placed on a telephone line or connection that identifies all local and long distance
numbers dialed, whether the call is completed or not. Id. at 63-64, 720 P.2d at 813. The telephone
conversation itself is not monitored. Id. at 64 n. 15, 720 P.2d at 813 n. 15.
77. Id. at 56, 720 P.2d at 809.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Denial of Gunwall's motion to suppress was upheld, however, because the court found other
evidence in the affidavit sufficient to show probable cause for obtaining the warrant. Id. at 70, 720 P.2d
at 817. Thus, the court need not have decided petitioner's state constitutional claim at all.
81. Id. at 64, 720 P.2d at 814.
82. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812; see also Deukmejian &Thompson, supra note 7,at 991-96 (similar
criteria discussed); Howard, supra note 19, at 935-39 (same); Utter, supra note 22, at 509-24 (some of
the same principles proposed as guides to interpretation of the language of the state constitution).
A two-step process is implicit in the analysis the court undertakes. First, whether the federal or the
state provision should be applied, and second, how broadly or narrowly that provision should be
interpreted. The court's statement of method does not prescribe a two-step analysis. However. in
deciding the case it first uses the criteria to decide to apply state law instead of federal law, and then
relies on precedent from other states to determine the scope of the state constitutional right. Gunwall.
106 Wn. 2d at 67-68, 720 P.2d at 815-16.
83. The representation of the court's analysis here is necessarily brief, since the court's own
discussion is scant. See Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 61-62, 65-67, 720 P.2d at 812-15.
84. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
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federal Constitution, either because it is "more explicit" than any provision
in the federal Constitution, or without any federal counterpart at all. 8 5 The
court concluded that under the language of article I, section 7,86 the
the state had unreasonably intruded into the
relevant inquiry was whether
87
defendant's private affairs.
2. "Significant differences in the texts of parallel state and federal
constitutionalprovisions." 88 The second criterion states that significant
differences in the texts of parallel provisions may justify relying on the state
constitution. This criterion also suggests that even if significant differences
are not present, other relevant provisions of the state constitution may
require the state constitution to be interpreted differently. 89 In applying this
criterion, the court noted that the language of the fourth amendment is
substantially different from that of article I, section 7, because the state
provision expressly protects a citizen's private affairs. 9° The court concluded that the material difference in language permits a more expansive
interpretation of the state provision. 9 1
3. "State constitutional and common law history."92 This criterion
addresses whether the state constitution was intended to confer greater
protection, by reference to historical evidence relevant to the scope of state
provisions. 93 Although the court found it unnecessary to consider state
common law history on searches and seizures, it did find the rejection of a
proposed provision identical to the fourth 94amendment at the 1889 state
constitutional convention to be significant.
4. "Preexistingstate law." 95 The fourth criterion calls for examination
of previously established bodies of state law, including statutes, to determine if they are responsive to the issues raised by analogous state constitutional claims. 96 The court discussed Washington's statutory protections for
electronic communications, especially section 9.73.010 of the Washington
85. Id.
86. See supra note 71.
87. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 65, 720 P.2d at 814.
88. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 71.
91. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 65-66, 720 P.2d at 814.
92. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
93. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812. Since the federal Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states
when Washington's constitution was drafted in 1889, it is questionable that any of its provisions were
expressly intended to confer "greater protection" than the federal Constitution in the way that the
Gunwall court uses that phrase. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
94. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 66, 720 P.2d at 814-15.
95. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
96. Id. These bodies of law, according to the court, help to define the scope of constitutional rights.

Id.
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Revised Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to wrongfully obtain knowledge of a telegraphic message. It concluded that the existence of such
protections supports resorting to independent state constitutional grounds
for determining the propriety of intrusions involving telephone communi97
cations.
5. "Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions." 98 The fifth criterion considers how differences in the structure of
state and federal constitutions may affect interpretation of the state provisions. Criterion five notes that while the federal Constitution is a grant of
enumerated powers, the state constitution acts as a limitation on the
otherwise plenary powers of the state government. 99 The court concluded
that this fact supported construing article I, section 7 as offering protection
for individual privacy rights. 100
6. "Matters of particularstate interest or local concern." 10 1 The last
criterion asks whether the subject matter of the state constitutional provision is local in character, or whether it requires national uniformity. The
court stated that the former is a more appropriate setting for applying the
state constitution. 102 The court concluded that this criterion overlapped
criterion four, in the sense that a balance must be struck between the need
for national uniformity in search rules relating to telephone communications, and contrary state policy considerations. In the case of telephone
records and pen registers, the court found that state policy considerations
3
outweighed the interest that existed in uniform national rules. 10
The court's stated reasons for adopting these criteria were to ensure that
decisions reached on independent state constitutional grounds avoided
excessive judicial policymaking and unnecessary deviation from United
States Supreme Court precedent. 104 The court was also concerned that
97. Id. at 66, 720 P.2d at 815.
98. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
99. Id. It follows, according to the court, that "the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our
state constitution may be seen as a guaranty of those rights rather than as a restriction on them." Id. It is
difficult to understand what the court meant by this. Although the federal government has those powers
that are expressly granted to it by the Constitution, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316.
404-05 (1819), and state powers are retained, both the Bill of Rights and the Washington Declaration of
Rights limit governmental power. The court implies that thejustification for independently applying the
state constitution arises from the difference between granted and retained powers. This difference is
more formal than substantive, however, since both state and federal powers are ultimately granted from
the same souce-the people. A better justification for independent interpretation is that it restores, as
nearly as possible, the original relationship of functional equality between state and federal constitutions. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
100. Gunwall. 106 Wn. 2d at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
101. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
104. These decisions, the court said, should "be made for well founded legal reasons and not by
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these decisions be the product of reason, not "pure intuition," 105 and that
they provide a reliable basis for predicting the results of future decisions. 106
In fashioning this analytical method, the court made no reference to the
primacy model of analysis it had adopted in State v. Coe 0 7 just two years
prior, nor to any of the other approaches previously employed by Washington courts.108
III.

ANALYSIS

The court in State v. Gunwall recognized that state constitutional doctrine cannot be applied to new cases and new issues unless it is understandable and logically reasoned. 109 However, the analytical method adopted by
the court achieves this result in a way that limits the ability of Washington
judges to develop strong independent state constitutional doctrine. The
Gunwall method sacrifices legitimate interests of constitutional federalism" 0 to the goal of minimizing departure from federal precedent.
Although preserving national uniformity is a possible relevant interest, 1 it
is inadequate by itself to create a firm base for state constitutional analysis.
Focus on uniformity inhibits the development of a comprehensive body of
state constitutional doctrine that could serve to enhance respect for state
2 Further, it undermines the role of state, as
law and the state's sovereignty. 11
opposed to national, law as a means of responding readily to social
change. 113
While the court did not consider the value of other methods of state
constitutional analysis that have been employed by Washington courts in
the past, the primacy model used in State v. Coe'1 4 has several advantages
over the method adopted in Gunwall.1 15 Washington law can be benefited
by a consistent decision on the part of courts to address state constitutional
issues first. The Gunwall criteria may be retained under the primacy model
as interpretive principles. " 6 In this way, the primacy model can become a
merely substituting our notion of justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States
Supreme Court." Id. at 63, 720 P.2d at 813.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 60, 720 P.2d at 812.
107. 101 Wn.2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
108. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
109. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 60, 720 P.2d at 812.
110. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
111. See Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 994-96.
112. See supra note 22.
113. See Utter, supra note 22, at 495.
114. 101 Wn. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:569, 1987

more powerful tool for developing the state constitution than the Gunwall
method employed alone.
A.

Gunwall Presumes That FederalConstitutionalDoctrine Is
Controlling

1.

An InterstitialModelfor Washington

The method of state constitutional analysis adopted by the court in
Gunwall is a form of the interstitial model. 117 The court examined federal
law first, and applied its six criteria to determine whether the state constitution provides alternative protection. 118 Its opinion expresses concern with
maintaining the integrity of United States Supreme Court precedent and
with avoiding judicial activism, both typical concerns of the interstitial
method. 119 Gunwall's analysis assumes that use of the state constitution

must be justified in each particular case, and that deviation from federal
doctrine should be limited-assumptions that are also characteristic of the
interstitial method. 120
2.

FederalSuperiority

The Gunwall court began with an implicit premise that only one constitution, federal or state, applies to a given claim in a given case.121 The
court's criteria are generally addressed to determining when the state
constitution provides "cogent grounds" for reaching a decision different
from that mandated by the federal Constitution. 122 Under the court's
method, the state constitution is to be applied only when a particular
interpretation different from the federal interpretation is justified through
117. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
118. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 64-67, 720 P.2d 808, 814-15 (1986).
119. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
120. Gunivall, 106 Wn. 2d at 58, 60-61, 63, 720 P.2d at 810, 812-14; see supra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text.
121. Although this premise is not made explicit in the court's opinion, it is implicit in the way the
court frames the issues. The court prefaces its general discussion of the criteria by explaining that they
are "relevant to determining whether, in a given situation, the constitution of the State of Washington
should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the United States Constitution." Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d at 61, 720 P.2d at 812. Its statement of the issues presented on appeal,
however, makes clear that the criteria are to be used to make a choice between state and federal
protection: "When is it appropriate for this court to resort to independent state constitutional grounds to
decide a case, rather than deferring to comparable provisions of the United States Constitution as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 810.
122. Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812.
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use of the criteria. In effect, the structure of the court's method creates a
presumption that federal law controls, which must be rebutted through use
of the criteria. 123
The circumstances under which this presumption can be overcome are
ultimately quite circumscribed. The first two criteria focus on limiting
independent interpretation to state constitutional provisions that are textually different from the federal Constitution. 124 The third and fourth
criteria are aimed at identifying different types of historical intention to
depart from federal law. 125 Only the last two criteria do not refer expressly
to differences in language or intent. 126 Criterion five is addressed to
structural differences between the state and federal constitutions, but its
explanation of those differences is not sufficiently developed to overcome
the federal law presumption alone. 127 Criterion six focuses on matters of
local interest, and suggests that state policies can justify independent
interpretation. 128 Matters of state interest or local concern are certainly
relevant, but are meaningful primarily within the context of substantive
analysis. Criterion six, therefore, is also unable to provide an independent
framework for decision.
The court's method rests mainly on the idea that state constitutional
doctrine that differs from federal doctrine is illegitimate unless expressly
justified by clear differences in text or historical intent. If no such differences can be identified, the federal Constitution as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court is presumed to control. But as commentators
have pointed out, there is no persuasive reason why independent state
constitutional analysis should be so narrowly restricted. 129 State courts are
equally free to adopt independent interpretations where state and federal
provisions are the same as where they are different. 130 The only reasons to
limit independent interpretation to state provisions markedly different from
123. See Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REv. 353, 356 (1984).
124. These criteria are the textual language of the state constitution, and significant differences in
the texts of parallel state and federal constitutional provisions. See supranotes 84-91 and accompanying text.
125. These criteria are state constitutional and common law history, and preexisting state law. See
supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. Criterion three focuses on the intent of the drafters of the
state constitution, and criterion four focuses on prior expressions of intent by either the legislature or the
courts. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
126. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Because analysis based on state constitutional
structure is by its nature tied to the text of the document, criterion five is closely related to the first four
textually based criteria.
128. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
129. Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L.
REv. 273, 282-84 (1973); Utter, supra note 22, at 506.
130. See supra note 129.
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federal provisions are to help preserve national uniformity of constitutional
doctrine, and to accord respect to the reasoning of majority opinions of the
United States Supreme Court. 131 But respect for the Court does not require
that its reasoning be accorded the status of a presumption. Further, national
uniformity of rights is irreducibly provided by the federal Constitution in its
capacity as a "floor" of protection. 132 Preserving uniformity beyond this
level, however, is at odds with the basic concept of independent state
constitutional interpretation. 133
B.

Gunwall's Methodology Diminishes State Law Independence and
Finality, and Reduces Judicial Economy

1.

Independence

Independent interpretation of the state constitution can confer benefits
that go beyond reaching different results in a particular case. Among the
broader reasons that exist for independent interpretation is the goal of
increasing respect for state law, and hence for state sovereignty. 134 This
goal will be best served if state constitutional doctrine is developed by
creating a separate, rational, independent body of law.
At a minimum, the goal of independence requires a court to keep its state
analysis separate from any federal analysis. 135 This is particularly important in interstitial analysis, which always discusses federal law. However,
the federal law presumption adopted in Gunwall makes separation of
analyses difficult because its very existence causes federal law to dominate
131. Particular doctrines or modes of analysis employed by the Supreme Court are certainly open
to dispute, as the Court's numerous five-four and plurality opinions demonstrate. See, e.g., Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct 2841 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
132. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text; see also infra note 180 (federal floor will be
maintained despite active independent interpretation of state constitutions). For an analysis of the state
constitution that accords considerable respect to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
without using such a presumption, see State v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 153-76, 720 P.2d 436,441-53
(1986) (Durham, J., concurring). Justice Durham reaches a result similar to the federal one through this
analysis. Id. at 171, 720 P.2d at 451 ("We reach a comparable result through different reasoning.").
133. Cf Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From A Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1981) (incongruous to speak of independent state constitutional
protections where development of state constitutional doctrine is dependent upon federal doctrine); see
also infra note 180. The irony of the court's focus on preserving uniformity is that the Gunwall method
itself permits considerable independent action in one of the main areas where uniformity could be
beneficial-the area of search and seizure law. See State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 703-06, 674 P.2d
1240, 1250-51 (1983) (Dimmick, J., dissenting) (critique of allowing variation in search and seizure
standards), overruled, State v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
134. Collins, supra note 133, at 5-6; Collins, supra note 47, at 388 & n.54.
135. Collins, supra note 63, at 93.
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not only the opinion, but the thinking of the judge writing it. 136 Judges who
begin their analyses with a discussion of presumptively controlling federal
doctrine later tend naturally to look to federal cases whenever they are
in doubt, rather than relying upon independent state-based lines of

analysis.
This characteristic is apparent in the opinions of courts that have applied
Gunwall's method. 137 These opinions rely on prior state precedent in their
state constitutional analyses, but do not distinguish between state cases that
engage in fourth amendment analysis and those that develop an analysis
keyed to independently construed state constitutional structure and history. 138 The result is that even when the state and federal analyses occupy
separate sections of the opinion, the state analysis still appears to be
interwoven with the federal analysis. 139
A separate problem arises because when courts analyze federal constitutional issues first, as Gunwall requires them to do, and then decide the case
on state grounds, their opinions as to the federal law are necessarily
dicta. 140 If the adequacy of the state law ground goes unchallenged, or is
upheld under the Michigan v. Long standard, 14 1 the statements as to federal
136. See, e.g., State v. Bakke, 44 Wn. App. 830, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). Although the Bakke court
devoted a section of its opinion to consideration of the Gunivall factors, Id. at 840-42, 723 P.2d at
539-40, its state analysis was in fact not kept separate from its fourth amendment analysis. Id. at
832-33, 723 P.2d at 535-36.
137. Fury v. Seattle, 46 Wn. App. 110, 122-24,730 P.2d 62, 68-69 (1986); State v. Bakke, 44 Wn.
App. 830, 840-42,723 P.2d 534,539-40 (1986); State v. Boyce, 44 Wn. App. 724,728-30,723 P.2d
28, 30-31 (1986).
138. See, e.g., State v. Bakke, 44 Wn. App. 830, 723 P.2d 534 (1986). The Bakke court began its
opinion with a discussion of principles that it generally applied to both the fourth amendment and article
I, section 7. It then discussed the cases cited by the defendant, without expressly keying the discussion
to either the fourth amendment or article I, section 7. In its later application of the Gunwall factors, the
Bakke court relied in its state analysis on State v. Campbell, 15 Wn. App. 98, 99, 547 P.2d 295, 297
(1976), a case that considered the constitutionality of a warrantless entry under the fourth amendment
and article I, section 7. Campbell in turn conducted a primarily federal constitutional analysis. Id. at
100-03,547 P.2d at 297-99. Finally, after concluding that the police entry did not exceed the scope of a
reasonable search under state precedent, the Bakke court determined that the seizure involved was
lawful by recourse once again to federal precedent. 44 Wn. App. at 841-42, 723 P.2d at 540.
139. United States Supreme Court opinions may be examined for the persuasiveness of their
reasoning on a particular issue without having this effect. There is a substantial difference between
citing a Supreme Court case for its holding, and examining its approach to analysis. If the analysis is
compelling, it must still be demonstrated to apply within the context of the state constitution, taking into
account the different structure and purposes of that document. See Brennan, supranote 9, at 501-02;
see also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn. 2d 1, 4-13, 726 P.2d 445, 447-52 (1986) (federal precedent
discussed, but integrated into independent state historical and common law foundations); State v.
Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 153-76,720 P.2d 436, 441-51 (1986) (Durham, J., concurring) (same); State
v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686, 698-703, 674 P.2d 1240, 1242-50 (1983) (same), overruled, State v.
Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436..
140. See Collins, supra note 47, at 393 n.68.
141. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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doctrine will never be reviewed by the federal courts. 142 This may happen
just as easily where the federal doctrine is uncertain as where it is settled. If
a subsequent state court relies upon the prior court's federal analysis in
construing the state constitution, layers of state constitutional doctrine may
come to rest on unreviewed state court constructions of federal law. 143 Such
case law will lack independent analytical consistency, and its credibility
will suffer accordingly. 144
2.

Finality

Commingling of state and federal precedent not only dilutes the integrity
of state constitutional doctrine, but may also permit its reversal by the United
States Supreme Court. Michigan v. Long1 45 states that a court relying on
federal cases in its state analysis can avoid Supreme Court review by complying with the "plain statement" rule. 146 But there is an apparent conflict
between this formalistic rule and the Court's assertion that it will accept
review where state and federal law are interwoven. 147 One commentator has
suggested that since the plain statement rule is formal, and the "interwoven"
test substantive, the Court may not always defer to a plain statement if the
underlying reliance on federal doctrine is substantial. 148 A close reading of
theLong decision supports the suggestion that under some circumstances the
Court may not accept a plain statement at face value. 149
142. If a decision of a state's highest court is effectively insulated from Supreme Court review by
an adequate and independent state ground, any consideration of federal constitutional issues can only
have an advisory effect. See Collins, supra note 47, at 393 n.68.
143. This problem could be avoided if the court confined its use of Supreme Court cases to
examination of modes of analysis which were then integrated into its discussion of the state constitution. See supra note 139.
144. The issue here is not that all state pronouncements on federal law should be reviewed, but that
state judges construing state law should take responsibility for their work. State law is more credible
when it rests on a foundation in full control of the state judiciary.
145. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
146. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
147. The Court stated that the plain statement rule means that it will assume there are no adequate
and independent state grounds "when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the [state] court relied
upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its
decision primarily on federal law." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (emphasis added). If
federal decisions are in fact interwoven with the state law, and the Supreme Court defers to a plain
statement, the Court is indicating that it is interested only in the intent of the state court, not the
substance of its analysis. The overall thrust of the interwoven test is substantive, however, and rests on
the Court's perception of whether the state court felt compelled by federal law to decide as it did. Id. at
1042 nn.7-8.
148. Collins, supra note 63, at 92-93; see also Collins, supra note 47, at 405-06, 405 n.112 and
cases cited therein; Developments, supra note 9, at 1340-42.
149. See Collins, supra note 47, at 398-99, 399 n.87, 403. The Long Court stated that its plain
statement rule "obviates in most instances the need to examine state law in order to decide the nature of
the state court decision ..
"Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041(1983) (emphasis added). In a
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The Gunwall court's method of analysis promotes reliance on federal
constitutional doctrine, and has been employed without regard for the plain
federal
statement rule. 150 Michigan v. Long may not completely foreclose
151 Careful
review even if courts comply with the plain statement rule.
drafting of the opinion, therefore, is still a wise course. Given the degree of
deference Gunwall accords to federal law, the capacity of lower courts to
consistently meet this drafting burden is questionable. 152 Use of the Gunstage for federal review of cases decided
wall method may therefore set the153
on "independent" state grounds.
3.

JudicialEconomy

At the broadest level, Gunwall's method of analysis does not take into
account the principle that courts should decide cases on the basis of the
lowest possible law. 154 Courts in general agree that a case should not be
decided on constitutional grounds if a statutory ground or other basis is
available.15 5 It follows that it may not be the wisest course to employ the
federal Constitution if an identical principle in the state constitution will
serve. 156 First, it is sensible for state judges to address issues of federal law
as infrequently as possible, because they are not the final authorities on that
law.157 Second, economical use of United States Supreme Court resources
footnote to this statement the Court declares that "[t]here may be certain circumstances in which
clarification is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate
action." Id. at 1041 n.6.
150. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. Gunwall did not emphasize that compliance
with Long is important, although it did cite the case in a footnote. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn. 2d 54, 67
n.24, 720 P.2d 808, 815 n.24 (1986). The lower court opinions applying Gunwall's criteria discussed
above, supra notes 137-38, lack such a plain statement.
151. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
153. Justice Durham's concurring opinion in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 153-76, 720 P.2d
436, 441-51 (1986), demonstrated an awareness of the issues raised by Michigan v. Long, and
successfully addressed them by employing a form of primacy analysis. Justice Durham addressed the
state constitution first, and turned to the federal Constitution only to establish the height of the federal
floor. Her discussion of federal case law was extensive, but it did not compel the state result she reached,
and was not interwoven with state law so that the state grounds were unclear. See id.
154. See Collins, supra note 47, at 391; Linde, supra note 6, at 383; Utter, supra note 22, at 505.
Application of this principle is arguably most appropriate when the choice is between a statute and a
constitution, because the need for judicial review of statutes is reduced by their susceptibility to popular
override. State constitutions, however, resemble statutes because they are relatively easy to amend, and
because their content is generally comprehensive to the point of resembling a code. See Developments,
supra note 9, at 1353. Application of the lowest law principle to the choice between state and federal
constitutions thus makes good policy sense.
155. Linde, supra note 6, at 383.
156. Utter, supra note 22, at 505.
157. State judges speak most authoritatively on issues of state law because those issues are
consigned to their final jurisdiction. Their judgments have the most force when they construe that law.
See Utter, supra note 22, at 505.
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suggests that as many cases as possible ought to be finally decided at the
state court level. 158 Gunwall's federal law presumption, however, limits the
use of state constitutional grounds to particular cases. State constitutional
provisions that are similar to federal provisions are unlikely to provide
grounds sufficient to overcome the federal presumption. 159 These provisions therefore will be rendered inactive, eliminating the state law ground
for decision in cases involving issues falling within their language. This
makes it inevitable that cases will be decided on federal constitutional
grounds when state ones would have sufficed. The result will be an increase
in the number of cases that are potential candidates for appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.
In the long run, it is difficult to understand how state constitutional
interpretation can ever be truly independent as long as there is a presumption, even if rebuttable, that federal law controls. 160 The deference to
federal law that results from the use of the Gunwall method interferes with
the development of an analytically independent body of state constitutional
law. Since the goal is independent interpretation, the method of analyzing
state constitutional issues chosen should support this goal, not subvert it as
does the Gunwall method.
C.

The Primacy Model Providesa Sounder Theory for Washington
Independent Interpretation

1. Providing EnhancedSecurity Is the ProperRole for Washington's
Constitution
A basic level of protection for civil liberties has already been guaranteed
to all citizens by the application of most of the Bill of Rights to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 161 Given this fact, the most logical role
left for the state constitution to play is to provide an enhanced security for
the rights of Washington citizens by adding another level of protection. 162
158. For a discussion of the Court's burgeoning work load, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
65-68 (11th ed. 1985).
159. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9 with U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2; compare also WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 3 with U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process clause) andU.S. CONST. amend. XIV (due
process clause).
160. One exception is law developed under a state constitutional provision, such as Washington
Constitution article XXXI (the state equal rights amendment), that has no conceivable federal counterpart. In analyzing such provisions, the court will have no choice but to rely upon its own intellectual
resources.
161. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 158, at 422-40; Brennan, supra note 9, at 493-94.
162. Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108, 113
(1981).
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Therefore, the most important function of state constitutional analysis is to
preserve the power of the state constitution to protect individual rights.
State v. Gunwall, however, employed a reactive rather than an independent
approach to state constitutional analysis. In so doing, Gunwall truncates
the potential of the state constitution to serve as the source of doctrines that
offer more complete or more rational means for protecting civil liberties
than do federal constitutional analyses.
2.

The Value of PuttingFirstThings First

Independent state constitutional interpretation in the modem era has the
potential to provide the kind of "double security" against violations of civil
liberties that the federalist system has long provided against general governmental overreaching. 16 This goal can be served by returning state
constitutions as nearly as possible to their original relationship of functional equality with the federal Constitution. 164 The state constitution can
successfully enhance security for individual rights by adding another
complete level of protection. The primacy model of analysis, previously
adopted in Washington in State v. Coe,165 offers a realistic means of
achieving this goal.
a.

Use of the Primacy Model Benefits Application of Both the Federal
and the State Constitution

The primacy model does not assume that only one constitutional provision, federal or state, can apply to a given case; 166 nor does it adopt a
presumption that this provision should be a federal one. 167 Its foundational
assumption is rather that both constitutions always apply, and that litigants
do not choose one or the other, but are protected in tandem by both.168
Under this model of analysis every provision of the state constitution may
be used, not just those that vary significantly from the federal Constitution
on their face. 169 A consistent application of the state constitution through
163. Id. at 237-38, 635 P.2d at 113; Brennan, supra note 9, at 502-03.
164. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. Recall that the federal Constitution provides a
floor of protection through the Supremacy Clause. Above that floor, state courts are free to adopt state
doctrines providing more protection. Developments, supranote 9, at 1333-35. State constitutions thus
respond to the supremacy principle, while having a full range of action above the federal floor. They are
equal in protective action, but they do not present any challenge to federal supremacy.
165. 101 Wn. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); see supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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the primacy model would thereby develop the whole state constitution, not
just isolated provisions.
Concurrently, the primacy model effectively preserves federal claims. If
the state constitution does not provide relief in a particular case, the litigant
may press for relief under the federal Constitution. 170 Resolving state
claims first, however, would ensure that the federal Constitution would not
be invoked unless necessary. 171Cases would be decided on the basis of the
lowest possible law,'7 2 and only those claims that genuinely require federal
protection would reach the United States Supreme Court.
A further argument in favor of the primacy model is the clear separation
of federal and state constitutional claims that it provides. Because primacy
analysis begins with state claims rather than ending with them, it avoids the
tendency of interstitial analysis to embellish or complete state law arguments by reference to federal doctrines. 173 In addition, primacy analysis
enables state courts to accept not only arguments based on the text or
structure of the state constitution, but a variety of other arguments as
well. 174 For instance, state courts could adopt the viewpoints of Supreme
Court dissenters on an issue if they believed those views were better
reasoned, without regard to whether there was express state language 75 or
historical intent1 76 authorizing the choice. Judges could, and probably
would, explain how state law departed from federal law, but their analyses
would be unfettered by the presumed superiority of federal reasoning.

170. See supra notes 41-47. Some commentators have objected that the primacy model requires
litigants to exhaust any possible state claims in state court before having access to the federal courts.
Project Report, supra note 9, at 288. But the primacy model does not require that state constitutional
claims be raised; it says only that if they are raised, they should be addressed first.
171. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. Properly applied, the primacy model of
analysis would only discuss federal constitutional claims if the state claims failed. See supra notes
41-46 and accompanying text. This insures against interweaving state and federal grounds for decision,
because if the state claim fails, the only possible grounds remaining would be federal ones. See Collins,
supra note 47, at 390 n.58, 396-408. Discussion of federal precedent in resolving a state constitutional
claim would almost by necessity be limited to the persuasiveness of the Supreme Court's reasoning,
since it would be difficult for federal law to compel the answer to a question that was from the beginning
solely one of state law. Under primacy analysis, state constitutional claims would not be in any way
dependent upon the outcome of possible federal claims, and the possibility of confusion would be
reduced. See supra note 46.
174. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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b.

The Primacy Model Allows Courts to Create a PrincipledBody of
State ConstitutionalLaw

Another characteristic of primacy analysis is that it does not require
fixed reliance on particular criteria to limit the scope of constitutional rules
or to avoid excessive policymaking at the judicial level. The scope of state
constitutional rules may be limited by developing doctrines based directly
on the text and structure of the state constitution, rather than in reaction to
federal language or structure. Primacy analysis yields decisions that are
based on clearly articulated state grounds, and that openly rest on state
policies. Activism can be controlled because the judges making these
policies, unlike the federal judiciary, are elected and are thus directly
responsible to the people at large. 177 As a final check, if the people are truly
dissatisfied with the policies expressed in state constitutional law, they may
supplant them by amending the state constitution. 178
Finally, the primacy model permits a wider range of doctrinal variation
above the federal floor than does Gunwall's model of analysis. This allows
better representation of regional political and moral views. 179 If it becomes
necessary for those views to be tested at the United States Supreme Court
level, the issues will be clearer by reason of their development within the
context of the state constitution. 180
177. See Utter, supra note 22, 495-96.
178. See WASH. CONST. art. XXIII.
179. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envl. Council, 96Wn. 2d 230,238,635 P.2d 108,113
(1981); Howard, supra note 19, at 940; Utter, supra note 22, at 495; Developments, supra note 9, at
1350-51.
180. One concern that independent state constitutional interpretation raises is that active use of
state protections will reduce the United States Supreme Court's motivation for maintaining a strong
body of federal law. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 7, at 975. This result is unlikely, however,
precisely because of the regional differences found in our country. There will always be states where
rights will be interpreted conservatively. Litigants from these states may be counted upon to press the
Supreme Court for protections their states will not give. In addition, bills of rights under state
constitutions are on the whole as broad or broader in scope than the federal Bill of Rights. See Force,
supra note 5, at 159-82; Graves, State ConstitutionalLaw: A Twenty Five Year Summary, 8 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 17-21 (1966). If state constitutions are consistently and independently applied, the
protection they provide will thus usually equal or exceed federal protection. The response of one
Georgia judge to a recent survey on the subject of independent interpretation is revealing in this regard:
The Supreme Court of Georgia does not favor the use of State Constitutional law in view of the fact
that in the criminal law field especially, the State Constitution gives the individual more protection
than does the Federal. The field of free speech is the only field in which our Court follows the State
Constitution, and it is more protective than the Federal. Strangely enough, lawyers in the state have
not realized that you can depend upon the State Constitution rather than the Federal. If they did, we
would have some interesting opinions coming from our Supreme Court in its effort to ignore the
more protective State Constitution.
Quoted in Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions, and IndividualRights
LitigationSince 1980: A JudicialSurvey, 13 HAIsINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 599, 609-10 (1986).
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The True Value of the CriteriaAnnounced in State v. Gunwall

The primacy model is the most appropriate means of answering the
question of when to apply the state constitution, but the criteria developed
by the Gunwall court retain value as interpretive principles. Considerations
82
of textual language' 8' and state constitutional and common law history'
are fundamental to developing state doctrine independently rather than in
reaction to federal law. Washington had a well developed body of law under
some provisions of its state constitution 183 well before the incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. 184 This history is highly
relevant to developing an independent foundation for state doctrine. 185 The
structure of the state constitution as an historically separate check on state
power 186 provides the logic for developing state guarantees as a dual level of
187
protection for state citizens. Finally, reflection.of local policy concerns
forms an important rationale for independent state constitutional rules. The
analytical principle of Coe and the analytical principle of Gunwall can in
combination work to create a vital state constitution. All that remains is to
apply these principles together to develop Washington constitutional doctrine fully and consistently.
V.

CONCLUSION

The interstitial method of state constitutional analysis adopted in State v.
Gunwall is ultimately less satisfactory than a methodology which combines
the Gunwall criteria with the theoretical purity of the primacy model.
Primacy theory is preferable to interstitial analysis for determining when to
apply the state constitution for several reasons. First, it provides a rational,
principled method of analyzing state constitutional issues. Second, it
builds a body of independent state law which is more likely to maintain its
independence and to avoid successful petitions for United States Supreme
Court review of state constitutional decisions. Third, it better supports state
sovereignty and offers greater flexibility in meeting changing social mores
on a local level. Finally, primacy theory preserves the independence of the
181. Criterion one, see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
182. Criterion three, see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
183. Criterion four, see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922) (adopting exclusionary rule as
remedy for illegal searches and seizures under Washington Constitution article I, section 7).
185. See e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wn. 2d 686,699, 674 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983), overruled, State
v. Stroud, 106 Wn. 2d 144, 674 P.2d 436 (1986).
186. Criterion five, see supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
187. Criterion six, see supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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body of state constitutional law, and provides restraints on judicial activism. The decision of the court in State v. Gunwallto supplant this system
was thus ill-considered.
The analytical criteria applied to state constitutional analysis in State v.
Gunwall are not without value. If employed in conjunction with a consistent application of the Washington Constitution to every case in which it is
raised, these criteria are appropriate guides to interpretation of the state
constitution. Integration of the Gunwall criteria with the primacy model
will create a consistent and principled method of state constitutional
analysis, ensuring that the power of Washington's constitution to protect its
citizens will be preserved.
Linda White Atkins
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